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Gender Discrimination in Property Rights: 
Six Centuries of Commons Governance 
in the Alps 
MARCO CASARI AND MAURIZIO LISCIANDRA 
 
Starting from the Medieval period, women in the Italian Alps experienced a 
progressive erosion in property rights over the commons. We collected documents 
about the evolution of inheritance regulations on collective land issued by 
hundreds of villages over a period of six centuries (thirteenth-nineteenth). Based 
on this original dataset, we provide a long-term perspective of decentralized 
institutional change in which gender-biased inheritance systems emerged as a 
defensive measure to preserve the wealth of village insiders. This institutional 
change also had implications for the population growth, marriage strategies, and 
the protection from economic shocks. 
 
n many societies women are discriminated against in economic life. 
We contribute to the economic explanations of gender discrimination 
by focusing on the discrimination in property rights. In particular, we 
study the structure of property rights on the common pastures and forests 
of hundreds of small peasant villages in the Italian Alps from the late- 
Medieval to the modern period (i.e., thirteenth-nineteenth century). Our 
systematic analysis of the original documents reveals a clear trend of 
erosion in women’s inheritance rights. In the thirteenth century, women 
enjoyed extended rights on collective land, but by the end of the eigh- 
teenth century inheritance of the collective properties was nearly every- 
where patrilineal. 
This research presents three qualifying aspects. First, it considers insti- 
tutional changes over a very long time span. Second, this investigation 
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comprises hundreds of villages in the alpine region of Trentino, each of 
which could independently adopt a variety of inheritance rules. One can 
exploit variations in village characteristics to infer the drivers of insti- 
tutional change. Third, the increasing gender discrimination in property 
rights with the advent of the Modern period provides the opportunity to 
study economic factors behind this process. 
We describe the historical evolution towards inheritance rules that 
favored men over women and provide an interpretation about the under- 
lying mechanism. We claim that an egalitarian inheritance system on the 
commons could encourage immigration to such an extent that villagers 
wanted to better protect the common resources. This could be achieved 
through a discriminatory inheritance system. We then discuss reasons 
on why, in this historical setting, a patrilineal system was preferred to a 
matrilineal one. 
When commons are overexploited, the ecological balance can be 
compromised (Hardin 1968; Netting 1981). The villages of Trentino devel- 
oped formal protective measures to limit “the tragedy of the commons” 
in the form of local charters (Casari 2007; Tagliapietra 2013). The char- 
ters regulated access to the commons by both insiders and outsiders. 
The most immediate form of appropriation by outsiders was trespassing, 
which was avoided by establishing property rights on the common land 
through the demarcation of land borders, establishment of legal rights, 
and hiring of guards to patrol the land.1 Even when the resource was no 
longer open-access, opportunistic behavior over the commons could still 
occur in other ways. Outsiders could move in, settle down in the village 
and claim the use of common land and resources. To restrict access to 
the commons, insiders created a special legal status, called membership 
right, which granted only to the original members of the village a full 
belonging in terms of rights and duties. Such regulations and entitle- 
ments were widespread in many areas of Europe (Ostrom 1990; De Moor 
2008, 2009; Alfani 2011). Outsiders could oftentimes gain access to the 
commons by marrying a member. If left unchecked, this would effec- 
tively increase the size of the group. Hence, here is where the inheritance 
system intervened. Under an egalitarian inheritance system, in which 
both men and women enjoyed membership rights, outsiders from poor 
villages could indeed enter a rich village by marrying an insider. Most 
 
1 Similar protective measures discussed by Neeson (1993) in eighteenth century England were 
also intended to regulate usage and reduce or solve the tragedy of the commons. Both Neeson 
(ibid.) and Casari (2007) see management of the commons as a long-term interaction between 
individuals of small, close-knit groups living in the same village, who succeeded to establish and 
enforce an efficient system of property rights. 
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likely, this had distributional consequences on rich villages as it could 
contribute to depleting the per capita amount of common resources. On 
the contrary, a patrilineal inheritance system could have discouraged 
outsider men from marrying insider women. Thus, inheritance systems 
of membership rights could play an important role in determining group 
size, because they shape the incentives for migrations and fertility. We 
focus on migration because it can modify group size more quickly than 
can changes in fertility rates. 
At the outset, we will provide an overview of the management of the 
Trentino commons as well as an outline of their property rights structure. 
We then discuss the preference given to a patrilineal over a matrilineal 
inheritance system on the commons. Our central thesis will build upon an 
institutional analysis based on original documents, a theoretical analysis 
of the economic incentives in relation to alternative inheritance systems, 
and quantitative models supported by evidence from hundreds of villages. 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TRENTINO FROM 1200 TO 1800 
 
The Environmental and Historical Setting 
 
Trentino is a mountainous region in Northern Italy with a few hundred 
small villages. Environment and climate are typical for the region of the 
Alps with steep slopes, rugged forests, harsh winters, and mild summers. 
The altitude across the region varies between 67m and 3,764m above the 
sea level. Land at lower altitudes, where the slope is gentle, was typically 
used as plow land, vineyards, and meadows; whereas, the land above 
1,600m is characterized by long periods with snow and can only sustain 
pastures or forests. The land owned in common consisted of mostly 
forest, alps, and pastures at high altitudes, while individual land was 
mostly made up of cropland and meadows at low altitudes. Hence, the 
share of land owned in common varied by land type: it ranged from about 
11.0 percent for plow land, vineyards, orchards, and vegetable gardens, 
to about 25.5 percent for the meadows at low altitudes, up to 72.5 percent 
for forests, grazing land, and alps.2 Commons were very important for the 
peasants’ survival. Forests were a precious source of firewood to warm 
up houses during the long and harsh winters, timber to build houses and 
craft furniture, and underbrush material for animal bedding. Logging was 
also a valuable activity, which was mostly performed by males. Hunting 
 
2 Estimates of land ownership are expressed in terms of surface by land type and are based on 
a sample of 32 villages from the 1780 cadastral register. See the Data Appendix for more details. 
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was also available on the common land, though rarely mentioned in 
documents. There were complementarities in production between indi- 
vidual and collective land. Consider, for instance, the activity of cattle 
grazing: the collective land was mostly at high altitude and, hence, best 
used during summertime, while the individual land was mostly at low 
altitude and, best used during wintertime. In particular, during summer, 
cattle grazed on the high mountain pastures and peasants mowed the hay 
on the lowest meadows. Summer grazing activity was often organized 
collectively through appointed herdsmen. As the summer season drew to 
an end, the cattle were moved onto the low pastures and, after harvest, 
onto the arable land. During winter, cattle were kept inside stalls and fed 
with the hay stored during summertime in barns. Both men and women 
engaged in hay mowing and, more generally, in farming. The commons 
were not open access resources, to wit, available for everyone to use. 
Instead, they were collective property of a well-defined group of individ- 
uals living in the same village or group of villages with legal entitlement 
to use the resources (Casari 2007). 
The Prince-Bishops of Trento ruled over the region for almost eight 
centuries: from 1027 until 1796 (Figure 1). From the thirteenth century, 
peasants gradually started to codify a set of rules for the management  
of their resources into charters (carte di regola). Charters were official 
deeds enacted by the assembly vote of pater familias of a village or 
group of villages and engrossed by a notary in the presence of external 
witnesses. Subsequently, charters were confirmed by the Prince, who 
granted self-government on the commons and other local economic 
affairs, and certified that the charters were compatible with existing laws. 
Such documents regulated (i) the right to establish appropriation rules of 
the collective resources, (ii) the right to hold local assemblies and appoint 
a governor (regolano) and other officials, (iii) the right to locally enforce 
the appropriation rules by levying cash fines, and (iv) the protection of 
common resources from external encroachment. The statute of the capital 
town, Trento, had a special status because its regulations could apply to 
the whole region. More precisely, the statute of Trento applied in case an 
issue was missing from a village charter. 
The charters mainly contained restrictions intended to preserve the 
commons from overuse or improper use by insiders and to limit access by 
outsiders. Charters typically sanctioned trespassing and limited access to 
the collective resources by insiders through regulations on harvest quotas, 
appropriation times, and zoning. An example of a regulation was the 
“wintering rule.” A villager had to feed his cattle with grass from his own 
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FIGURE 1 
TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN TRENTINO 
Source: Drawn by the authors. 
 
 
meadows during the winter months, to be permitted to place the cattle on 
the common pastures in the summer.3 The village of Civezzano was the 
first to write a charter in 1202. The charter system collapsed because of 
an exogenous political event at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Napoleon invaded the region in 1796, and the charter regime was defini- 
tively abolished in 1807.4 The most ancient charters did not provide a 
systematic discipline for all aspects of village life or the management of 
common resources. Occasionally, rules were updated by the addition of 
new chapters annotated on the same document of an existing charter, or 
by enacting an entirely new charter. Over the six-century period, some 
villages adopted more than one charter. The charters appear as pragmatic 
instruments adopted by uneducated peasants revolving around actual liti- 
gation cases. The charters reflected specific responses to external chal- 
lenges or contingent problems, which can be noticed in the sequence of 
isolated tweaks to the rules observed in some cases, often listed as addi- 
tions to a pre-existing charter. Thus, the charters summarized in writing 
the way peasants resolved critical controversies that arose in the past. If 
an issue was not present in a charter, most likely it had not been a contro- 
versial matter. 
Villages generally consisted of houses grouped together around the 
church and the main square. According to the 1810 census, the median 
village population was 394. The population dynamics in the region during 
the period under scrutiny are shown in Figure 2. Overall, the popula- 
tion in Centre-North Italy grew by 32 percent between 1300 and 1800 
 
3 For example, the charters of Vigolo Vattaro (1496), Comun Comunale (1544), and Mortaso 
(1558) explicitly mentioned this regulation. 
4 In 1802, the Paris Treaty abolished the Principality of Trento. The Austrian government in 
1805 forbad the gatherings of village members in the assemblies, and in 1807, the Bavarian 
government, which had taken power in Trentino through the Peace of Pressburg (1805), abolished 
the Carte di Regola and subjected Trentino towns and villages to the central government (Rizzoli 
1903). 
1027 1202 1348 1525 1630 1780 1801 
Foundation of 
the Principality 
of Trento 
First known 
charter 
Black Death Peasant War Italian Crisis Last record of a 
charter 
Theresian 
Cadasters 
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FIGURE 2 
POPULATION ESTIMATES IN THE CENTRE-NORTH OF ITALY AND TRENTINO 
Notes: The Centre-North of Italy includes Piedmont, Val d’Aosta, Nice, Monaco, Lombardy, 
Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige,  Friuli,  Istria,  Liguria,  Emilia-Romagna,  Tuscany,  Umbria,  
and Marche. Fiebiger (1959) estimates that Trentino made up 34.7 percent of the entire Tyrol 
population in 1754. We applied this fraction to the estimates of Tyrol population in Wopfner 
(1954) for antecedent dates. The Trentino population estimates in Franceschini (2009) refer to the 
1573–1615 and 1685–1723 time intervals, for which we considered the median years 1594 and 
1704, respectively. 
Source: Malanima (2002) for the Centre-North of Italy. Cole and Wolf (1974) for Trentino in 
years 1312, 1427, 1650, 1754. Further Trentino estimates: Debiasi (1953) in 1700; Franceschini 
(2009) in 1594, 1704; Chiocchetti and Chiusole (1965) in 1780. 
 
 
(Malanima 2002); whereas, in Trentino, it grew by 131 percent between 
1312 and 1754–1780.5 More precisely, population estimates for Trentino 
are 83,373 units in 1312, 167,000 units in 1594, 206,000 in 1754, and 
180,000 in 1780 (Chiocchetti and Chiusole 1965; Cole and Wolf 1974; 
Franceschini 2009). The population estimates for Trentino are scattered 
but are coherent with the patterns of population for Centre-North Italy. 
In particular, from the more systematic data of the entire Centre-North 
of Italy, one can identify some focal dates that marked a change in the 
direction of population growth, such as the Black Death of 1348 and the 
Italian crisis of 1630. 
 
 
5 According to Malanima (2002), the population in the Centre-North Italy in 1300 was 
7,750,000; whereas, in 1800 it was 10,120,000. The 131 percent increase in Trentino population 
is based on the average between the estimates of 1754 and 1780. 
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Rights to Access Collective Resources 
 
This section provides a taxonomy about the possible ways to access the 
collective resources and to participate in the village life. The focus in this 
article will be on the membership right (vicinia), which defined the most 
complete belonging to a community. We refer to those with membership 
rights as members or insiders (vicini). The family was the unit of refer- 
ence for membership rights and consisted of all relatives living under 
the same hearthstone (fuoco). The legal representative of the family was 
usually a male—the pater familias—who had the right to participate in 
and vote at assemblies. If husband and wife were both members, they 
were entitled to the same benefits and duties as if only one spouse was  
a member. If at least one living individual of the family was a member, 
then the benefits from the commons were extended to all members of the 
family. People without membership rights were outsiders, a category that 
also includes those with the simple right to reside in the village, or with 
some right to appropriate the commons (Casari and Lisciandra 2011).6 
The membership right gave full access to all benefits and duties. The 
membership right was a personal right not related to the size and nature 
of private land. An insider enjoyed four categories of rights: (1) residence 
rights—the right to live in the village and thus have a stable domicile; 
(2) full appropriation rights—the right to access and exploit the common 
resources; (3) participation and voting rights in the assembly, in partic- 
ular, rights to participate and speak at assemblies, to appoint officers, and 
to vote on decisions concerning management and alienation of collec- 
tive resources, inheritance systems, acquisition of residence, appropria- 
tion, and membership rights; and finally, (4) inheritance rights, and more 
specifically, the right to transmit the membership to offspring according 
to regulations. 
Sometimes, outsiders could live in the village with limited or no rights 
to access the commons. The most widespread entitlements were the 
appropriation right and the residence right. A holder of the appropriation 
right could enjoy the right for at most his lifetime but could not pass it 
on to descendants through inheritance. The appropriation right granted 
some or all of the following entitlements: grazing, mowing grass, cutting 
 
 
6 The aim of this study is neither to provide a legal classification of rights nor to map in detail 
all cases. On the contrary, we aim at analyzing the documents through a parsimonious taxonomy, 
which reflects economic property rights, that is, those rights that an individual can actually exploit, 
regardless of what the formal or legal definitions might be. 
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timber, collecting firewood and litter, hunting and fishing, and trans- 
forming forests or pastures into arable land. In addition, it also entailed 
the residence right. Conversely, the simple residence right did not per se 
entitle the right-holder to use the collective resources. To acquire the resi- 
dence right, outsiders often had to formally introduce themselves to the 
village and give assurance about their integrity and economic welfare. 
Typically, residence rights were granted to artisans, shopkeepers, and 
servants. The resident population of a village could be larger, sometimes 
considerably so, than the group of people with membership rights. 
 
How to Acquire the Membership Right 
 
The membership right could be acquired in three ways: by purchase, 
by inheritance from a partner, or by inheritance from parents. 
Purchase. A single member could not transfer or alienate his or her 
individual membership right. Only the assembly could sell a member- 
ship right. Generally, the assembly granted its formal consent to accept 
new members with a vote requiring a simple majority of the participants. 
Some charters required the unanimity. Generally, prospective members 
also had to fulfill a few requirements such as (i) having a good repu- 
tation, (ii) paying the village treasury a certain amount of money, and 
(iii) having held stable residence in the village for a certain period of 
time. The membership right gave equal rights and duties to newcomers 
as to pre-existing members. This provision was mainly mentioned in  
the charters but was sometimes documented in contracts of membership 
purchase. 
Inheritance from partner. In the case of marriage between an insider 
and an outsider, the insider spouse kept his or her status through marriage 
and could sometimes pass it on to their children. As a consequence of the 
marriage, the outsider spouse could receive—depending on the charter 
rules—the membership right, the appropriation right, or no right at all. 
Whereas, in the case of marriage between two insiders, membership 
rights could not be cumulated since the unit of reference was the family. 
One spouse’s membership right, typically the wife’s, remained dormant 
while she was married and became active only with widowhood. 
Inheritance from parents. The membership right became manifest 
when the heir left the parents to form a new family, or alternatively, at the 
rights-holder’s death. We have identified four basic inheritance systems 
for collective resources from parents: egalitarian, soft-patrilineal, patri- 
lineal, and Erbhof systems. These inheritance systems encompass all the 
systems encountered in the Trentino charters. Egalitarian: all sons and all 
daughters of insiders inherited the membership rights. Soft-Patrilineal: 
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all sons of insiders inherited membership rights whereas daughters did 
not, unless daughters had no brothers. In the latter case, one daughter or 
all daughters could inherit membership. If only one daughter inherited 
the membership, she was usually designated by the father or by the rela- 
tives; alternatively, the charters usually gave the rights to the first-born or 
the last-born. Patrilineal: all sons of insiders inherited the membership 
rights whereas daughters did not, even if they had no brothers. Erbhof: a 
variant of the primogeniture system in which only one child of an insider 
family inherited the membership rights (Rösch 1994). Ordinarily, the 
heir was a son chosen by the father’s last will or, if lacking, by the closest 
relatives. If there was no son, or the son was not considered suitable  
and fit, one (and only one) daughter could inherit the membership (along 
with the private assets) conditionally to marrying a man, who could be 
an outsider. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL EVIDENCE 
 
The charters are the main source of information about property rights 
on the commons. Not all charters are available either in their original 
form or as a later copy. Some charters were lost or destroyed and we have 
only indirect evidence about their existence and date of promulgation 
from other sources. 
For the purpose of this study, we define as formalized inheritance regu- 
lation the written description or modification of rules about the inheri- 
tance of the membership rights on the commons. This written evidence 
comes from charters or originates from other documents such as member- 
ship purchase contracts, which were endorsed by a notary; these contracts 
sometimes mentioned the customary inheritance rule currently in force. 
Some charters also described the inheritance system previously in force, 
which constitutes another piece of information that allows tracing the 
evolution of inheritance systems. 
The diffusion of charters in Trentino is shown in Table 1. We divided 
the six centuries of interest (1202–1801) into four intervals of at least 
100 years each. The end years of the intervals were the following: 1348, 
which marks the European-wide plague; 1525, which records the revolt 
that involved peasants in Germany and also in Trentino; 1630, which 
denotes the beginning of a period of declining population in Northern 
Italy and of crisis related to epidemic diseases; 1801, which was the last 
date for which a record of charter adoption or modification exists, shortly 
after Napoleon’s invasion of Trentino. 
The diffusion of the formalized inheritance regulations on the commons 
followed different patterns from the charter adoption. In 1525, villages 
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TABLE 1 
CHARTERS SYSTEM IN TRENTINO 
 Year  
 1348 
Black 
Death 
1525 
Peasant 
War 
 1630 
Italian 
Crisis 
1801 
Napoleon 
Invasion 
Area in hectares with charters 159,771 414,351  506,167 542,482 
Percent of the Trentino surface 
(625,143 hectares) 
25.6 66.3  81.0 86.8 
Number of villages with charters 54 210  268 301 
Notes: The surfaces are in hectares and cover the villages with a charter in force during a specific 
year considering the extension of the villages according to the 1897 cadastral register. Both 
charters available and charters no longer available but with a known date are considered. The 
total number of villages considered in our dataset as belonging to Trentino was 366. 
Source: Elaboration on our charters database and on the 1897 cadastral register. 
 
that had a charter already covered about two-thirds of the region (Figure 
3). Conversely, in the same year, only four villages covering about 2.5 
percent of the region had formally introduced inheritance regulations 
over their commons. Formalized inheritance regulations became more 
widespread later in time, often when the village enacted its second or 
third charter. By 1801, more than four-fifths of Trentino, in terms of terri- 
tory, had adopted a charter while villages with formalized inheritance 
rules covered only 25 percent of the region. 
Three main findings about inheritance systems on the commons in 
Trentino emerge from the documental evidence in our possession. First, 
inheritance systems for the transmission of membership rights on the 
commons changed over time. Second, almost all changes eroded women’s 
rights to inherit collective resources. Third, the majority of the charters 
did not formalize any inheritance regulation of membership rights on 
collective resources. 
During the six centuries under scrutiny, the patterns of inheritance 
changed substantially (Table 2). We divided the regional area by type of 
inheritance system based on all available documental evidence. At any 
given point in time, three or four different inheritance systems in the region 
coexisted given that each charter could independently shape local institu- 
tions. The erosion of women’s rights is visible from the shift from egali- 
tarian to soft-patrilineal systems, between 1525 and 1630, and the shift 
toward a patrilineal system by 1801. A process of gradual convergence to 
a unique system can be observed, and in particular, a clear later dominance 
of the patrilineal system, which acted as an attractor. Initially, in 1348, the 
patrilineal system covered 24 percent of the encoded charters with a known 
  
 
 
 
 
1525 (Peasant war) 1801 (Napoleon invasion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charters 
Formalized Inheritance Regulation 
 
FIGURE 3 
MAPPING CHARTERS AND FORMALIZED INHERITANCE REGULATIONS IN TRENTINO 
Notes: Areas with solid gray identify the presence of a charter that we know existed, while areas with striped gray identify the presence of formalized inheritance 
regulations on the commons. As reported in Table 2, in 1525 the inheritance system is known for 27 villages; however, the above map shows only the four 
villages that actually formalized their inheritance system (striped gray). In the remaining villages, the information comes from later documents that formalized 
inheritance regulations. Areas in white had neither a charter nor inheritance regulations. A geographical unit in the map is colored when most of its surface 
satisfies the condition of having a charter and/or formalized inheritance regulations by 1525 and 1801. The figure maps the areas covered by the charters using 
the geographical units of the current cadastral registers for the Trentino. 
Source: Drawn by the authors. 
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TABLE 2 
INHERITANCE SYSTEMS ON THE TRENTINO COMMONS 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
charter in 1801 
inheritance rules 
Notes: The surfaces are in hectares and cover the villages with a charter in force during a specific 
year considering the extension of the villages according to the 1897 cadastral register. Evidence 
for the inheritance system has been retrieved from all available sources. In 1801, the total area of 
villages in Trentino that had adopted a charter amounted to 527,281 hectares; we considered only 
charters whose text was available. Notice that this area differs from the 542,482 hectares reported 
in 1801 (Table 1), which also includes the villages with charters that are not available but whose 
existence is known and whose date can be traced. 
Source: Elaboration on our charters dataset and on the 1897 cadastral register. 
 
system, and by 1801, the percentage had risen to 97. Thus, the evolution of 
inheritance rules is essentially unidirectional, going from equal member- 
ship rights for men and women toward increasing gender discrimination.7 
As an illustrative case, consider the 1583 reform of the inheritance 
system that took place in the Fiemme Valley. Their Governor explains to 
the Prince the motivation by stating: 
Up to now in our Fiemme Community we followed the rule that when outsiders 
married women who were members of our Community, they inherited membership 
rights and used the commons and the woods as much as any other member who 
was born in the Community. Lately, since many outsiders have been marrying 
women of the Fiemme Community with the sole purpose of acquiring membership 
rights […] our Community has consensually convened that from now on women 
members of our Community shall not have nor inherit membership rights should 
they marry outsiders.8 
Hence, the inheritance system switched from egalitarian to soft-patri- 
lineal. The village of Fondo, for its part, switched from a soft-patrilineal 
 
7 A similar pattern of erosion of women’s general property rights on the commons was observed 
by Alfani (2011) in other parts of Northern Italy. 
8 Translated by the authors from Italian from the original manuscript, AST, lat. sect., C.12, f. 
69 and 72. This provision was also reported in the 1613 charter of Fiemme, chapter 117 (Sartori- 
Montecroce 2002). The Fiemme Valley grouped together a cluster of villages. 
 
Type of system 
(surface in hectares) 
1348 
Black 
Death 
1525 
Peasant 
War 
1630 
Italian 
Crisis 
1801 
Napoleon 
Invasion 
Egalitarian inheritance 43,845 43,845 0 0 
Soft-patrilineal inheritance 6,420 6,420 54,305 2,449 
Patrilineal inheritance 16,643 21,472 68,592 151,306 
Erbhof inheritance 2,623 2,623 2,623 2,623 
Area with inheritance rules (A) 69,531 74,360 125,520 156,378 
(A) in percent of area with a 
13.2
 
14.1 23.8 29.7 
Number of villages with known 25 27 59 80 
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to a patrilineal system in 1777 by restricting women’s right to access the 
commons. Those women who in a soft-patrilineal system enjoyed the 
membership right lost it in favor of the appropriation right, hence losing 
the possibility to transmit access to the commons through inheritance: 
In the future, we do not want to obey the ancient custom with regard to community 
members who have no son but only one or more daughters; [according to the new 
rule, the youngest daughter of an insider can use the commons] only during her 
lifetime, and when she dies, the right to use the commons shall be extinguished; 
and her heirs shall be foreigners in the same way as if they had never been 
community members…9 
After listing all documental instances of inheritance regulations, we trace 
the evolution of inheritance systems village by village over six centu- 
ries. Overall, 80 Trentino villages (out of 290 with accessible charters) 
mentioned inheritance rules in their charter or other related documents 
by the end of the period (see Table 2 and Data Appendix). A flowchart 
of the institutional changes between 1202 and 1801 is shown in Figure 4, 
providing a bird’s-eye view of all recorded modifications to inheritance 
rules across villages. The initial explicit introduction of inheritance rules 
in the 80 villages appears as an arrow from left to right. Following changes 
in the type of inheritance system are represented as an up or down arrow 
connecting the four “system” boxes on the right side. Simple restatements 
and clarifications of membership rights that took place within the same 
type of inheritance system are indicated through curly arrows that origi- 
nate and end within the same box. Figure 4 depicts a story of relentless 
weakening of women’s inheritance rights on the commons. According to 
our data, in the late-Medieval period women enjoyed the highest levels 
of equality in property rights on the common property resources. From 
that period on, a steady process of convergence took place towards a 
patrilineal system, without backtracking. At the end of the period, 75 
villages had a patrilineal system, three had a soft-patrilineal system, two 
had the Erbhof system, and none had an egalitarian system. By the time 
Napoleon invaded Trentino and forcefully removed the charter regime, 
the process of erosion of women’s rights on the commons was already 
complete.10 
 
9 Translated by the authors from Italian from the original manuscript: Fondo 1777 (Inama 1931, 
p. 24). 
10 We identified only one exception to the general tendency to restrict the inheritance of 
membership rights for women with one of the villages comprising Comun Comunale, which was 
a cluster of villages. In 1544, Comun Comunale adopted a patrilineal system and kept it that  
way until the end of the charter regime. In 1786, the small village of Piazzo adopted its own 
integrative charter, in addition to the “supra-charter” of Comun Comunale, thereby introducing a 
soft-patrilineal system. Plausibly, Piazzo did not intend to apply this system on the commons of 
Comun Comunale, but only to Piazzo’s commons. 
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FIGURE 4 
CHANGES IN INHERITANCE REGULATIONS OVER SIX CENTURIES 
Notes: Period 1202–1801. One observation consists of one village according to the geographical 
unit employed in the 1897 cadastral register. Some villages changed only marginally their 
inheritance rules. These changes are illustrated by curly arrows that originate and end in the same 
box. One village restricted the soft-patrilineal system from all daughters to one daughter only 
(Cavedine 1764). Some villages belonging to clusters of villages restated the rules either of the 
patrilineal system (Cimone 1768; Isera 1656; Marano 1796; Villa Lagarina 1759) or the soft- 
patrilineal system (Castello di Fiemme 1605) in their village charter. Other villages restated their 
previous regulations (Nago-Torbole 1628; Costa Savina 1739, 1792; Vigalzano 1739, 1792; Vervò 
1757). Two villages with patrilineal systems specified the rules in more detail (Pieve Tesino 1628; 
Aldeno 1662). Curly arrows also include modifications to appropriation rights (Mezzolombardo 
1777; Aldeno 1753). 
Source: Elaborations on the authors’ database of charters and other documents. 
 
A separate mention should be made of the Erbhof system, which 
remains as an isolated cluster in the flowchart. This system was preva- 
lent in the nearby German speaking villages of South-Tyrol (outside the 
Trentino) and in the two villages of Stramentizzo and Trodena, which 
were on the linguistic border between the German and Romance speaking 
territories. These two villages did not modify their inheritance system, 
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and interestingly, no other Trentino village ever adopted the Erbhof 
system (Cole and Wolf 1974). 
The third main finding is that more than 70 percent of the villages  
did not formalize their inheritance system on the commons. As shown 
in Table 2, the area without inheritance regulations decreased substan- 
tially between 1348 and 1801, but most charters still never mentioned 
inheritance rules. What was the system in place in these villages? The 
evidence about inheritance systems on the commons in the thirteenth 
century is scant. Nevertheless, based on four leads, we argue that in the 
late-Medieval Trentino the egalitarian system on the commons was likely 
to be widely followed though not formalized. The first lead comes from 
the 1425 statute of Trento. This statute applied to the whole Principality 
for those aspects that were not regulated in the local charters. The 1425 
statute disciplined the inheritance of private assets but not that of collec- 
tive properties. It stated that, in the absence of a dowry for the daugh- 
ters, both sons and daughters inherited the private assets of the parents, 
though the daughters inherited a lower share. On this subject, the older 
statute of 1307 devoted little attention. Second, the institutional history of 
Fiemme, a large cluster of villages that has existed as an entity since 1111 
(Sartori-Montecroce 2002), reports an explicit description of the egali- 
tarian inheritance system applied to its commons, which was in place until 
1583. In that year, inheritance regulations became soft-patrilineal. Third, 
the inheritance systems for private and collective properties in Fiemme 
were identical before 1583 (Sartori-Montecroce ibid., Le consuetudini di 
Fiemme - Libro II del civil, 1613 charter, Ch. 114, p. 278). Fourth, the 
oldest documental description of the egalitarian system is not a charter 
but a 1583 letter of the governor to the Prince-Bishop. This suggests that 
many other villages may have followed it as a custom, explaining why it 
was not explicitly written in the charters. Only 30 years later, the 1613 
charter of Fiemme included the transcript of a portion of the letter of the 
governor. 
To put this documental evidence into a broader context, it should be 
recalled that charters usually encoded only problematic aspects, espe- 
cially those that had generated controversies in the past. The Fiemme 
Governor’s letter offers a vivid illustration: when the frequency of 
marriages between local women and foreign men was low, or did not 
cause conflicts, little pressure was exerted to encode the inheritance rule 
into the charters. Another illustration of how charters encoded regula- 
tions comes from the explicit norms about the purchase of membership 
rights by outsiders. One would expect that those villages with immi- 
gration pressure would be more inclined to regulate both membership 
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purchase and membership inheritance. In fact, among the villages that 
mentioned membership purchase, about 68 percent also had inheritance 
regulations at some point. Whereas, among the villages with no mention 
of membership purchase, only 10 percent had inheritance regulations. 
One way to read this regularity is that field controversies were generating 
the formal regulations. 
One can put together the non-systematic codification of inheritance 
systems on the commons, especially in the early period, with the prag- 
matic spirit of the charters. If all marriages were between insiders, it was 
practically irrelevant for a village to be under an egalitarian or patrilineal 
inheritance system. A marriage between an insider and an outsider had 
different consequences under the two inheritance systems only if the 
outsider was the husband and the new family wanted to live in the village 
of the wife. When there was no immigration pressure on the village, then 
the two systems were observationally equivalent. The charter would be 
changed only when the attempts to immigrate through marriage were 
frequent or controversial. 
 
PATRILINEAL VS. MATRILINEAL INHERITANCE SYSTEMS 
 
We argue that gender discrimination in inheritance regulations emerged 
as an attempt to limit the size of the village and to protect insiders’ wealth. 
In Trentino, we observe a shift from an egalitarian toward a patrilineal 
system, but a similar protection of common property could be achieved 
through a shift toward a matrilineal system. In this sense, our economic 
arguments can be considered as gender-neutral. In the remainder of this 
Section, we illustrate a proximate and an ultimate cause for the adoption in 
Trentino of a patrilineal inheritance system instead of a matrilineal system. 
The proximate cause was the institutional mechanism for decision- 
making within a village. The decision-making power rested with the 
village assembly. With few exceptions, the assembly participants were 
all men, who were the head of their families (pater familias). An excep- 
tion in some villages was the presence of widows without sons or with 
underage sons. Moreover, in all observed villages, the officers were 
elected and were only men, regardless of the inheritance system in 
place. Offices included the scàrio (i.e., the assembly chair), the rego- 
làno (i.e., the governor), the massàro (i.e., an administrative officer), and 
the saltàro (i.e., a guardian). Thus, active and passive voting rights were 
clearly leaning towards men, even in villages with egalitarian inheri- 
tance systems (see, for instance, 1533 Charter of Fiemme). Hence, men’s 
personal interest would have been to vote for a patrilineal inheritance 
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system. A patrilineal system guaranteed a lifelong asset to widowers 
and single men, who otherwise had no access to the commons except by 
marrying a village member. It could also grant a larger set of marrying 
partners to choose from, especially spouses coming from external villages 
with a lower per-capita endowment of commons. In short, men possessed 
an institutional advantage that granted them the power to shape property 
rights on the common land. 
The ultimate cause was in relation to the widespread bias against 
women in property rights in societies across the world, as evident from 
the low frequency of matrilineal inheritance. Summarizing the field 
work of numerous anthropologists, George Murdock’s Ethnographic 
Atlas classifies societies along several dimensions, including inheritance 
systems. Among the sample of 186 well described clusters of societies— 
the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample—about 17 percent follow a matri- 
lineal system (Murdock and White 1969). This classification considers a 
broad definition of matrilineal inheritance systems, which includes also 
systems in which assets are transmitted through the sister’s son (avun- 
culate). Murdock (1967) also considered a more detailed breakdown of 
1267 societies presented in the Ethnographic Atlas and found that only 
four (0.3 percent) had a mother-to-daughter land inheritance rule. This 
database has no evidence about inheritance rules over land for more than 
half of societies (Gray 1998). 
The presence of a patrilineal inheritance system in a given society 
systematically correlates with some social, technological, and ecolog- 
ical factors. The main factors identified in the anthropological literature 
are paternity certainty, men presence at home, the presence of animal 
husbandry, lack of horticulture, or presence of plough agriculture. Low 
levels of paternity uncertainty have been given as an explanation of the 
preference for patrilineal systems because families can invest in patri- 
lineal heirs to whom relatedness is highly likely (e.g., Gaulin and Schlegel 
1980; Flinn 1981; Hartung 1985). Another factor that favors patrilineal 
systems is the presence of men at home, which is generally due to the 
lack of external warfare or migrations (Ember and Ember 1971; Divale 
1974; Jones 2011). The presence of animal husbandry or pastoralism 
appears to be positively correlated with patrilineal inheritance systems 
(Aberle 1961; Mace and Holden 2005). In particular, adopting cattle,  or 
other large domestic livestock, leads in many societies to the loss of 
matriliny whereas stability is found with patriliny (Holden and Mace 
2003). In terms of production technologies, Douglas R. White, Michael 
L. Burton, and Malcom M. Dow (1981) argue that women’s productive 
activity is mainly focused in secondary processing activities such as crop 
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tending, while men are relatively more involved in the beginning stages 
of production sequences such as soil preparation and the acquisition of 
raw materials. In particular, patrilineal systems are strongly associated to 
the presence of plough agriculture (Aberle ibid.; Boserup 1970; Alesina, 
Giuliano, and Nunn 2013). On the contrary, matrilineal systems are asso- 
ciated with horticulture productions (Aberle ibid.; Keesing 1975). 
According to these factors, one would predict a patrilineal choice of 
inheritance in Trentino. Paternity had a high degree of certainty because 
of monogamous marriages that were monitored by the Christian Church 
and because of the social sanctions on out-of-wedlock births. Men were 
rarely absent from home due to external warfare, which was infre- 
quent. They could be absent for seasonal migrations to the Italian cities. 
The Ethnographic Atlas does not specify if inheritance is on private or 
common land but one must consider the specific technological factors at 
play. The commons were mostly pastures and forest: cattle grazing as well 
as cutting, processing, and transporting timber were important tasks. Men 
were favored over these tasks, especially those related to timber, which 
required significant body strength due to the heavy manual labor and the 
use of handheld tools. Over the private land, the peasants practiced to a 
limited extent horticulture, and to a larger extent plough agriculture. 
 
INHERITANCE SYSTEM AS A PROTECTIVE MEASURE 
FOR THE COMMONS 
 
Insiders shaped inheritance regulations on the commons to preserve 
their share of wealth, which shrank as a consequence of a population 
increase. In fact, inheritance regulations affected the population level of a 
village through at least two channels: one that altered migration patterns 
across villages and the other that modified incentives for internal popula- 
tion growth. In the dynamics of village size, migration was a short-run 
factor, while internal population growth was a long-run factor. 
Migrations alone could increase or decrease the size of single villages. 
Consider a stable regional population where everyone gets married. If 
the spouses are from different villages they can decide to settle down in 
either the village of the husband or the wife. If private assets are mobile, 
the family will want to settle in the village that is “richer” in terms of 
collective resources. The young generation of a rich village could attract 
spouses from poorer villages. Consider a situation where every family 
has two children. Under an egalitarian inheritance system, if every 
member of the young generation marries an outsider, the number of fami- 
lies in a village may double. Hence, the per capita collective wealth in a 
rich village may halve within the period of one generation; whereas, the 
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poorer villages observe an increase.11 Thus, the inequality in per capita 
collective wealth is expected to decline over time. 
Conversely, a unilineal inheritance system, such as the patrilineal 
system that occurred in Trentino, can effectively prevent net immigration 
via marriage, which would maintain the same level of per capita collec- 
tive wealth. This system does not forbid marriages with outsiders, but it 
ensures that the number of families in the next generation will remain 
the same. In particular, women who marry men who are outsiders will 
move to their husbands’ villages since the new family has no access to 
the commons of the wife’s village. Hence, under a patrilineal inheritance 
system on the commons, the village will maintain its size, the inequality in 
per capita collective wealth will persist, and some genetic mixing will still 
be possible (Casari and Lisciandra 2015).12 In case both egalitarian and 
unilineal inheritance systems co-exist in the region, what matters is the 
type of system adopted by the villages that are better endowed in terms of 
per capita collective wealth. To avoid reductions in their share of collec- 
tive resources, insiders of rich villages tend to adopt gender-biased inheri- 
tance systems. In contrast, the choice about inheritance rules of insiders 
of poor villages is irrelevant: migratory patterns would be unaffected by 
their type of inheritance system, whether or not it is formalized. This can 
explain why we observed many villages with no available information on 
their inheritance regulations (Table 2). A formal model of migratory pres- 
sure along these lines is presented in Casari and Lisciandra (2015). 
The choice of inheritance system on the commons can make a differ- 
ence also in terms of fertility rates, and consequently, on internal popu- 
lation growth. This phenomenon has been known at least since Hardin 
(1968). When the subsistence of a family lies exclusively on its own 
private resources, the family bears the full costs of having an additional 
child. But if the family relies also on the collective land, the incentives 
to have children are higher because of the externality of appropriating 
collective resources. A portion of the cost of the additional child falls  
on the village at large, whose resources are subject to the typical mecha- 
nism of the tragedy of the commons. In an egalitarian inheritance system, 
“everyone born has an equal right to the commons” and this would “lock 
the world into a tragic course of action” (Hardin 1968). One solution to 
the tragedy about population control is a change in the inheritance system. 
 
11 One  must  also  consider  that  cross-village  marriages  may  present  some  benefits  from 
a collective point of view: small villages—like those in Trentino—run into severe risks of 
consanguinity if all marriages are between insiders, and cross-village marriages reduce this risk. 
12 The same outcome as the patrilineal system can be achieved through the Erbhof system, 
while it is easy to show that the outcome under a soft-patrilineal inheritance system is in-between 
that of an egalitarian and a patrilineal system. 
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The adoption of the Erbhof system on the commons fully removes the 
“tragedy” because additional children after the first one do not impose 
negative externalities on the commons. Compared to the egalitarian 
system, in the long-run, a patrilineal system provides a partial solution 
because it lessens individual incentives to have additional children since 
only about half of the children (the boys) can count on the commons. The 
patrilineal system attenuates, but does not solve, the tragedy about popu- 
lation control because for every additional child, some probability exists 
that the cost will be shifted to the village at large. 
Migration mainly occurs because individuals from poor villages may 
want to move into a rich village. Therefore, a high inequality in per capita 
collective wealth across villages gives rise to this course. Unfortunately, we 
lack systematic data about migratory flows, size, and wealth at the village 
level over the six centuries, but we have been able to construct an inequality 
index for 32 villages using 1780 cadastral data and 1810 population census 
data.13 The resulting Gini index in per capita collective wealth shows a 
high level of inequality across villages (0.61, N=32). The corresponding 
index in per capita total wealth denotes a lower level of inequality (0.27, 
N=32). The difference in the two indices could denote how commons were 
more unequally distributed than individual properties. This suggests that 
villages with a higher commons endowment may have acted to prevent the 
leveling-off in commons wealth among the villages in the region. 
We conjecture that the persisting inequality across villages in the 
value of per capita collective wealth originated from the occurrence of a 
series of shocks on population and wealth in the form of fires, landslides, 
flooding, famines, and plagues. These shocks plausibly hit villages in  
an asymmetric fashion. As a consequence, perfect equality was unlikely 
even in a society that universally adopted an egalitarian system. We also 
conjecture that the frequency and magnitude of the asymmetric shocks 
dominated the speed of population adjustments.14 
A regional population increase is another factor that induces migratory 
pressure. The population patterns, as depicted in Figure 2, could be the 
 
13 This sample from the 1780 register corresponds to 37 villages in the 1897 cadastral register 
(10 percent of all villages). See the Data Appendix for further information. 
14 After centuries under an egalitarian inheritance system, one would expect that both migrations 
and internal population growth should have brought about a situation of near equality. Direct 
support for this view requires evidence that we cannot provide on the inequality levels at the 
time when villages started to restrict women’s inheritance rights. Nevertheless, as documented 
previously, restrictions occurred over time without a clear-cut switch. Furthermore, if migrations 
and internal population growth had indeed generated convergence in per capita collective wealth 
by, say, the end of the sixteenth century, one needs to explain what produced the inequality 
observed two centuries later. Consider that long-run convergence in per capita collective wealth 
should have occurred also after women’s inheritance rights started to be restricted, assuming that 
fertility was positively related to per capita wealth. 
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triggers for the institutional changes that are observed in inheritance regu- 
lations. The frequency of inheritance regulations on the commons in the 
documents increases in periods of population growth. For instance, one 
can compare two adjacent periods, one with a population decline (1348– 
1430) and another with a population increase (1431–1600). The fraction 
of documents reporting inheritance regulations out of the encoded char- 
ters was 4.5 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively. What followed was a 
period of further population increase associated with an intense activity 
of inheritance regulations (1601–1630, 38.1 percent) and then a period of 
population decline associated with a less intense activity of inheritance 
regulations (1631–1650, 25.0 percent).15 
Hence, we observe two factors triggering internal migrations: inequal- 
ities in the values of per capita collective wealth and regional popula- 
tion growth. In particular, wealth inequalities help to explain why some 
villages adopted inheritance regulations whereas others did not. 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
This section uses a regression analysis to test the hypothesis that inher- 
itance regulations served as a protective measure to limit the overexploi- 
tation of the commons. One prediction is that villages rich in terms of 
common land and close to the main trading routes were more exposed to 
migratory flows and, consequently, were more likely to regulate inheri- 
tance. Another prediction is that population pressure led to greater regu- 
lations on the use of the commons. 
The quantitative analysis will be carried out according to two models: a 
static model and a duration model. The static model studies why a village 
ever adopted an inheritance regulation before 1801 and, hence, presents 
the factors that influenced the decision at any point before this date. The 
duration model studies whether and when a village adopted an inheri- 
tance regulation. We perform a survival analysis aiming at explaining— 
during the entire period under scrutiny—which factors influenced the 
occurrence of the first formalization of inheritance systems. The unit of 
observation is the village and corresponds to a geographic entity in the 
1897 cadastral register. The dataset considers the 289 villages that had 
adopted at least a charter by the year 1801 and for which we were able to 
encode the charter content.16 
 
15 For further details see Table 2 in Casari and Lisciandra (2014). 
16 The number of villages with at least one charter is 301 in total (see Table 1). For 11 villages, 
we know they had a charter, but we do not possess information on their content. For 290 villages, 
at least one charter was encoded. Trento, the capital town, was dropped from the original 290 
village dataset because of its peculiar role as the seat of government. 
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Static Model 
 
Proxies are built for the size of the village, its remoteness, and wealth. 
The proxy for village size is the village population taken from the 1810 
census.17 Proxies for village remoteness are the walking distance in km 
and the altitude difference from Trento, the regional capital, which has  
a central position in the region (Figure 3). The two proxies are weakly 
correlated (q=0.38). 
Proxies for wealth include the per capita value of the collective land 
and the per capita value of all land. The total value of all the land in   
the village is the sum over the surface of each land type in the village 
multiplied by its per hectare value.18 We employed the 1897 cadastral 
data to estimate the surfaces by land type of each village and the 1780 
cadastral data to estimate the average per hectare value in the region by 
land type. The value of the collective land in a village required informa- 
tion about the shares of collective ownership by land type, which was 
taken from the 1780 cadastral registers. Finally, the per capita values of 
the collective land and of all land derive from dividing the total value  
of the collective land and of all land, respectively, by the 1810 village 
population. 
An additional wealth variable provides the ratio between collective 
and individual land, which is computed for each village by dividing the 
value of collective land by the value of individual land. This ratio can 
capture the presence of production complementarities between collec- 
tive and individual land. Each village needed both types of land for effi- 
cient agricultural production. This is also shown by the high correlation 
existing between collective land and individual land in terms of surface 
(q=0.97) and in terms of value (q=0.78).19 Table 3 summarizes the statis- 
tics of all the variables mentioned above. 
Since villages that adopted formal inheritance regulations could have 
different population dynamics, compared to villages that did not adopt 
any regulation, issues of endogeneity are likely to occur for the village 
size variable. In other words, the adoption of inheritance regulation 
 
17  The census data is in Andreatta and Pace (1981). As in Casari (2007), when break-downs   
at the village level are not available, we use the proportions from the 1897 data (Consiglio 
provinciale d’agricoltura pel Tirolo 1903) as shares. 
18 Notice that, by construction, the variable total value of all the land in the village does not 
capture the benefits of good land management at the village level because the per hectare value is 
not derived from village-specific estimates but from the average value in the region of each type 
of land. 
19 The variables ratio between the value of collective and individual land and per capita value 
of collective land are also correlated (q=0.79). 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
 
 
 
(yes/no) 
 
 
 
inhabitants 
 
 
meters 
 
 
 
 
individual land 
Notes: The number of observations (villages) is 289. “Inheritance or membership purchase 
regulation” is a dependent variable coded as 1 if a village either had inheritance regulation or 
gave outsiders the possibility to purchase membership or both, and as 0 if otherwise. 
Source: Dataset constructed by the authors. 
 
 
could have affected the population dynamics itself. As a consequence, 
the per capita variables concerning the value of collective and of all land 
could suffer from the same problem. For this reason, the model estima- 
tion employs an instrumental variable probit.20 Given the small set of 
variables available, we use as instruments the total value of the collec- 
tive land in the village and the total value of all land in the village, 
respectively, for their corresponding per capita variables. The correla- 
tion between the per capita value of collective land and its instrument   
is 0.50, and between the per capita value of all land and its instrument  
is 0.26. The correlations do not appear strong, especially the latter one. 
We then performed a test on the relevance of the instruments by consid- 
ering the robustness of the F-statistics in the first-stage of the two-stage 
least-squares linear probability models. The coefficients for the value of 
collective land in the village and for the value of all land in the village are 
 
 
20 To obtain consistent estimates, we used the Stata command ivprobit, which fits probit models 
with continuous endogenous regressors, as in our case, and uses maximum likelihood estimation. 
Notice, however, that a Wald test is unable to detect whether the variables per capita value of 
collective land and per capita value of all land suffer from endogeneity (Table 4). 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Inheritance regulation (yes/no) .277 
 
.448 
 
0 
 
1 
Inheritance or membership purchase regulation 
.398
 
.490 0 1 
Independent variables 
   
Village population in 1810 in thousands 
0.633
 
0.719 0.052 7.069 
Walking distance to Trento in 100 km 0.49 0.29 0.03 1.29 
Altitude difference from Trento in thousand 
0.483
 
0.289 –0.121 1.385 
Per capita value of collective land in carantani 2.47 1.96 .08 19.45 
Per capita value of all land in carantani 7.42 3.56 .80 31.11 
Ratio between the values of collective and 
.48
 
.27 .092 1.67 
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statistically significant at 5 percent and at 10 percent levels, respectively. 
We claim that the instruments are uncorrelated with the regression’s error 
term because the value of collective land in the village and the value of 
all land in the village should have no direct impact on the attractive- 
ness of the village to outsiders. This would occur only through the per- 
capita values. Therefore, the instruments meet the exclusion restriction 
because they should not affect the decision to adopt some protective 
regulations. 
The static model shows four specifications (Table 4). Two specifica- 
tions include the per capita value of common land as wealth proxy, while 
two specifications include the per capital value of all land. The two vari- 
ables appear in separate specifications because they are highly correlated 
(q=0.90), and hence, can be used as alternatives. In all specifications, a 
Wald test confirms the presence of endogeneity in the structural equation, 
and consequently, the desirability of adopting the instrumental variable 
technique.21 In particular, specification (1) uses two proxies of remote- 
ness as regressors, and the per capita proxy for common land. 
The per capita value of collective land positively influenced the intro- 
duction of formal inheritance rules. This supports the interpretation that 
villages more endowed in per capita collective wealth were induced to 
formalize inheritance regulations to protect their wealth. In addition, 
more remote villages, in terms of altitude had a lower probability to 
formalize inheritance rules. A village with a per capita value of collec- 
tive land higher by one standard deviation than the average village has 
higher chances to introduce inheritance regulations on the commons by 
13 percent (Table 4, column 1). The same probability increase of adopting 
inheritance regulations occurs in villages that are 248m more elevated or 
45km more distant from the capital town than the average village. These 
results are consistent with the interpretation that geographically acces- 
sible villages formalized inheritance systems more often, compared to 
remote ones, because they were more subject to migration that threat- 
ened their commons. Furthermore, due to their less productive land, high 
mountain villages may have been less attractive to foreigners, and there- 
fore, barriers against them may have been raised less frequently. 
In specification (2), the per capita value of all land removes issues 
about incorrect estimates of ownership shares. The higher the per capita 
value of all land, the more likely it was that the village had inheritance 
 
 
21 A rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity means that the error terms in the structural 
equation and the reduced-form equation for the endogenous variable are correlated. Thus, 
instrumenting the endogenous variable was correct. 
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TABLE 4 
REGULATIONS ABOUT INHERITANCE ON THE COMMONS BY 1801 
(STATIC MODEL) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
1 = Regulation, 
 
 
Inheritance 
Regulation 
 
 
Inheritance 
Regulation 
Inheritance or 
Membership 
Purchase 
Regulation 
Inheritance or 
Membership 
Purchase 
Regulation 
0 = Otherwise (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Walking distance –0.2882 –0.2448 –0.5028 –0.3365 
to Trento (0.1755)* (0.1689) (0.2026)** (0.1806)* 
Altitude difference –0.5204 –0.2999 –0.6327 –0.2836 
from Trento (0.1161)*** (0.1224)** (0.1230)*** (0.1269)** 
Per capita value of 
collective land 
0.0659 
(0.0337)** 
 0.0806 
(0.0374)** 
 
Per capita value 
of all land 
 0.0896 
(0.0153)*** 
 0.1005 
(0.0101)*** 
Ratio between the 
values of collective 
and individual land 
 –0.6893 
(0.1615)*** 
 –0.7896 
(0.1538)*** 
Wald test of exogeneity 
(Prob>32) 
0.0125 0.0022 0.0044 0.0002 
Log likelihood –637.8 -821.4 –666.7 –847.9 
Number of observations 289 289 289 289 
(villages) 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: Marginal effects of instrumental variable probits (ivprobit in Stata) using MLE and robust 
standard errors. To control for geographical fixed effects, 12 area dummies are included among 
regressors; they are not reported in the table. Trento, the capital town, has not been included. The 
coefficients are the average marginal effects. The figures in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
Source: Database constructed by the authors. 
 
 
regulations. Moreover, a higher ratio between the value of collective  
vs. individual land is associated with a lower frequency of inheritance 
regulations: villages relatively more endowed with collective, rather than 
individual land, did not feel threatened by newcomers. 
As a robustness check, specifications (3) and (4) replicate the static 
model using an alternative dependent variable that incorporates the pres- 
ence of regulations about membership rights purchase. Because of archival 
issues or destroyed documents, we may have missed documents that regu- 
lated inheritance. For this reason, we have also considered the villages 
that regulated membership purchase. The introduction of a regulation on 
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the purchase of membership rights points toward a pressure coming from 
people who wanted to move into the village. Regulation on membership 
purchase could be seen as another instrument to regulate migratory pres- 
sures. Depending on the village, accepting outsiders through member- 
ship purchase required the consent of a majority of insiders. This alterna- 
tive variable takes value one if the village either regulated inheritance  
or gave outsiders the possibility to purchase membership or both, and 
zero if otherwise. The number of occurrences goes from 80 villages with 
inheritance regulation to 115 villages with either inheritance or member- 
ship purchase regulations. Both the inheritance and membership regula- 
tions were proxies for the village closure against migratory pressures. 
Specifications (3) and (4) confirm all results emerging from specifica- 
tions (1) and (2). 
 
Duration Model 
 
A duration model can exploit both whether and when a village formal- 
ized its inheritance regulations. The timing of inheritance regulations 
varied considerably across villages (Figure 3). A discrete version of      
a duration model is used to obtain the estimates presented in Table 5. 
This estimation technique is widely used in medicine, where it is called 
survival analysis. It relies on an event or transition, which in our case is 
the time of adoption of written inheritance regulations on the commons 
in a given village. The dataset for the duration model is based on the 
same 289 villages as in the static model, with observations at five-year 
time intervals between the years 1200 and 1800. As long as no transi- 
tion occurs, the dependent variable is set to zero; if the event occurs, the 
dependent variable is set to one, and the village is then deleted from all 
subsequent time intervals of the dataset. The duration model estimates the 
probability that the event occurs in the time interval between t and t+5, 
conditional on the village not having experienced the event at or before 
time t (risk set).22 The equation used to estimate the duration model is the 
following probit equation: 
 
8-1[P(t)] = a(t) + b X + b X (t) + u(t), (1) 
 
where 0 is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, P(t) is 
the hazard rate consisting of the ratio between the number of events that 
 
22 This approach is not a panel data analysis. Following a survival analysis, the dependent variable 
is constructed around the year of the change: each village enters the dataset with a different number 
of “observations.” This model does not allow for the inclusion of village fixed effects. 
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TABLE 5 
REGULATIONS ABOUT INHERITANCE ON THE COMMONS 
(DURATION MODEL) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Event=1 If Adopted Regulation 
in the Time Period, 
 
 
Inheritance 
Regulation 
 
 
Inheritance 
Regulation 
Inheritance or 
Membership 
Purchase 
Regulation 
Inheritance or 
Membership 
Purchase 
Regulation 
=0 If Not Yet Adopted (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Village population 0.1441 
(0.0638)** 
0.1653 
(0.0642)** 
0.1451 
(0.0603)** 
0.1695 
(0.0605)*** 
Dummy—Regional population 0.3108 0.3052 0.3684 0.3648 
growth (0.1432)** (0.1432)** (0.1263)*** (0.1264)*** 
Walking distance to Trento –0.2448 
(0.3083) 
–0.1299 
(0.3176) 
–0.4107 
(0.2961) 
–0.3073 
(0.3004) 
Altitude difference from Trento –0.5935 
(0.2401)** 
–0.5650 
(0.2413)** 
–0.6056 
(0.2118)*** 
–0.5603 
(0.2129)*** 
Per capita value of collective 
land 
–0.0015 
(0.0277) 
 –0.0103 
(0.0248) 
 
Per capita value of all land  0.0207  0.0190 
  (0.0155)  (0.0131) 
Ratio between the values of 
collective and individual land 
 –0.3487 
(0.2500) 
 –0.3938 
(0.2150)* 
Fraction of nearby villages that 0.7256 0.7348 0.7673 0.7808 
already had inheritance 
regulations 
(0.2741)*** (0.2757)*** (0.2023)*** (0.2032)*** 
Dummy—Italian crisis 0.4444 0.4430 0.4047 0.4063 
1600–1650 (0.1244)*** (0.1247)*** (0.1066)*** (0.1067)*** 
Dummy—Council of Trento 0.7486 0.7497 0.6113 0.6121 
1545–1565 (0.1049)*** (0.1051)*** (0.0979)*** (0.0981)*** 
Dummy—Peasant War –0.1510 –0.1377 0.0468 0.0506 
1525–1535 (0.3231) (0.3190) (0.2077) (0.2073) 
Constant –3.1616 
(0.2004)*** 
–3.2281 
(0.2172)*** 
–2.8963 
(0.1693)*** 
–2.9439 
(0.1821)*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.1312 0.1335 0.0944 0.0969 
Log likelihood –485.0 –483.7 –683.8 –681.9 
Number of observations 31,618 31,618 30,122 30,122 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: The duration model is based on a probit function (see main text). To control for geographical 
fixed effects, 12 area dummies are included among the regressors; they are not reported in the table. 
The Black Death dummy is omitted because it is a structural zero: during that period no village 
changed its inheritance system or membership purchase regulations. All villages are in the dataset     
at the starting date. Trento, the capital town, has not been included. The figures in parenthesis are 
standard deviations. 
Source: Database constructed by the authors. 
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occurred in time t (i.e., formalization of inheritance regulation on the 
commons) and the number of “surviving” villages in time t (risk set);23 
a(t) is the time trend; X
1 
is the vector of time-invariant variables; X
2 
is 
the vector of time-variant variables; u(t) is the i.i.d. error term such that 
E[u(t)]=0 and Var[u(t)]=o2. 
The time-variant regressors a(t) include dummies to control for impor- 
tant historical events in the area such as the Black Death (1350–1400), 
the Peasant War (1525–1535), the Council of Trento (1545–1565), and 
the Italian Crisis of the first-half of the seventeenth century (1600– 
1650). The time-invariant regressors are the walking distance from 
Trento, the difference in altitude with Trento, and the ratio between the 
value of collective and individual land as in the static model. In addi- 
tion, five time-variant regressors are used. The village size estimate      
at time t is built by taking the 1810 village population and scaling it 
using the ratio between the Centre-North Italy population at time t and 
in the year 1800.24 The per capita value of all land and the per capita 
value of the collective land are built by taking the corresponding static 
model variables and dividing them by the  village population estimate  
at time t. The regional population growth is a binary variable that takes 
value zero when the population in the Centre-North of Italy decreased 
and one when it increased over the time intervals presented in Figure 2. 
Finally, the model includes a variable about contagion, which consists 
of the fraction of villages around the same reference center that have 
already adopted inheritance regulations at time t.25 Notice that the popu- 
lation variable and the per capita variables are no longer endogenous as 
in the static model and are now included. This is the peculiarity of the 
duration models since, once the event (i.e., adoption of regulation) has 
occurred, the village is dropped from the dataset for the remaining time 
intervals. 
The results from the duration model presented in Table 5 are in line 
with those of the static model. In specifications (1) and (2), the depen- 
dent variable is the adoption of inheritance regulations in a given 
 
23 Put differently, P(t) is the probability that a village adopts a regulation of the inheritance 
system on the commons at time t. 
24 For the population of Centre-North Italy, see Malanima (2002). The data in Malanima does 
not cover the thirteenth century. The population data available for Italy in Bellettini (1987) have 
been used to rescale the village populations in 1300 backwards to 1200. The variable that proxies 
population that is called village size estimate at time t is built under the assumption of an identical 
population growth rate in all villages. 
25 The 17 reference centers are: Borgo, Canale S. Bovo, Canazei, Cavalese, Cles, Condino, 
Fondo, Levico, Malè, Mezzolombardo, Pergine, Pinè, Riva del Garda, Rovereto, Stenico, Tione, 
Trento. 
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five-year interval. The coefficients of remoteness and wealth proxies 
have the correct sign. While the coefficient of remoteness, in terms of 
altitude, is significant, the coefficients of wealth proxies are non-signif- 
icant. We believe that the lack of significance of the coefficient of the 
wealth proxies could originate from the inaccuracies of the variables. 
We have neither cadastral data nor regular population census data for 
each time interval along the six centuries considered. During such long 
horizons, villages could have sold or purchased individualized collec- 
tive properties, or changed their village boundaries through mergers and 
fissions. 
Three additional findings come from the time-variant regressors in 
specifications (1) and (2), whose estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant. First, in those periods when the regional population growth 
was positive, villages were more likely to adopt inheritance regulations, 
which is consistent with our view of regional population growth as a 
trigger for institutional change. Second, inheritance regulations seem   
to spread by contagion. The more widespread the adoption of inheri- 
tance regulations in nearby villages, the more likely the village was to 
adopt a regulation. Contagion from neighbors may come as a cultural 
imitation or as a defensive measure. We favor the latter interpretation, 
because the contagion proxy is defined locally: restrictions in the inheri- 
tance systems of nearby villages seem to shift the migratory pressure 
onto other close villages. In response, those villages could then decide 
to formalize or restrict inheritance rules to fence off the increased migra- 
tion, which they may not have done otherwise. In short, if an adjacent 
village adopted a patrilineal system, it restricted the set of available 
destinations for migrants, who would have sought residence in those 
nearby villages that remained egalitarian. Table 5 shows that this pres- 
sure seems to be a statistically significant force in making them change as 
well.26 Third, larger villages, in terms of population, were more likely to 
adopt inheritance regulations. This finding builds on Casari (2007), who 
showed that the largest villages were more likely to adopt a charter, and 
to have more ancient charters. The existing correlation between group 
size and inheritance regulations is not the consequence of a selection 
bias, because villages that did not adopt a charter were excluded from the 
regressions. 
 
26 The contagion process for charter adoption was different from that for inheritance regulations. 
Casari (2007) found that a similar local contagion variable did not explain the adoption of charters 
but a regional contagion variable did. Contagion regressors may create econometric issues which 
we do not consider in this article. We thank the co-editor for pointing this out. 
 Casari and Lisciandra 
 
 
For the duration model, we have also performed a robustness check 
using an alternative dependent variable. Specifications (3) and (4) in 
Table 5 explain the adoption of inheritance or membership purchase 
regulations, or both. This robustness check confirms and reinforces all 
the results emerging from specifications (1) and (2). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Between the late medieval period (thirteenth century) and the modern 
period (nineteenth century), women in the Italian Alps gradually lost their 
property rights on collective land. This finding comes from a system- 
atic study of inheritance systems on the commons in approximately 300 
villages. Economic forces drove institutional change. In particular, the 
erosion in women’s rights emerged as a protective measure to preserve 
the per capita endowment of collective properties. Egalitarian inheri- 
tance systems on the commons were evolutionarily unstable because 
they allowed immigration from outside through marriage, which threat- 
ened the common resources. Members of richer villages could preserve 
their share of commons by introducing a gender-biased inheritance 
system. The patrilineal system contributed to keep the village size  
stable by limiting net migration through marriage. This interpretation   
is supported by three key elements: the narrative in the original docu- 
ments of Trentino, the theoretical analysis of the economic incentives of 
inheritance systems, and the quantitative analysis based on hundreds of 
villages. 
A matrilineal system would have served the same purpose as a patri- 
lineal one. Under this alternative path, men—and not women—would 
have lost their property rights. There were specific factors that led the 
Trentino villages to prefer a patrilineal over a matrilineal inheritance 
system. We identified a proximate cause in the institutional mechanisms 
for decision-making, and an ultimate cause in social, technological, and 
ecological factors, such as low paternity uncertainty, the steady pres- 
ence of men at home, the importance of animal husbandry and plough 
agriculture. 
At the regional level, this institutional change was spread by conta- 
gion. Left alone under decentralized decision-making, villagers engaged 
in a progressive closure towards outsiders. The process was character- 
ized by path-dependency: the earlier decisions of some villages to change 
the inheritance system in favor of men effectively set the direction for 
subsequent adjustments in other villages, which moved the whole region 
toward a patrilineal system. 
Gender Discrimination in Property Rights  
 
 
The inheritance system on common resources turned out to be a corner- 
stone of the social and economic structure of Trentino because of its 
effect on migration patterns, economic inequalities, population growth, 
and gender discrimination. 
 
Data Appendix 
CHARTERS DATASET 
 
The Carte di Regola dataset has 878 entries. An entry could be either a charter (n.480), 
a charter’s change as additional chapters to the original charter after its official promul- 
gation (n.339), or any other relevant document (n.59). Entry dates range from 1202 to 
1801, while the dates of charters range from 1202 to 1796. For some entries, the dataset 
records only the date and the village of reference, while for others, it directly codes the 
content of the document, or it indirectly codes the content by relying on the comments 
of those who read the document. The entries based on the encoded contents of docu- 
ments are 680; whereas, the entries based on the simple existence of documents are 198. 
To construct the dataset about the charters and the inheritance systems, we mapped 
the information onto the 366 geographical units existing in the 1897 cadastral register. 
The cadastral register covers a wider area than the present-day province of Trento. The 
366 units considered also include three villages that are only partially in the province 
of Trento and exclude 12 units that are fully outside the present-day province (a total of 
378 units are in the 1897 cadastral register). 
In 1801, the situation was as follows: Out of the 366 villages, the charter system 
covered 301 villages. Among them, 290 had at least one charter that was directly or 
indirectly encoded while another 11 villages had charters, but we have no information 
about their content. 
The charters dataset includes published and unpublished sources. 
 
Published Sources 
 
Rizzoli (1901), Fontana (1907), and Nequirito (1988) provide the main lists of refer- 
ences of published charters. Giacomoni (1991) is the most important source for published 
charters, with 183 documents. Another 108 charters have been published by various 
authors (reference list available upon request), among them the following laurea thesis: 
Chiocchetti (1983), Epiboli (1977), Framba (1978), Motta (1978), Pederiva (1985), Piva 
(1981), and Sartori (1979). These sources account for 291 of the 480 charters entered in 
the database. The remaining 189 entries come from unpublished sources. 
 
Unpublished Sources 
 
A useful guide to the Trentino archives is Casetti (1961). The regional government 
allows public online access to the electronic scanning of original parchments, so that 
the text of 15 charters can be retrieved from http://www.trentinocultura.net/catalogo/ 
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cat_fondi_arch/pergamene/cat_pergamene_h.asp. For another 14 charters, we know of 
their existence but not their exact date. The remaining 160 charter entries contain the 
village or cluster of villages of reference and the date, but nothing more, because the 
text is unavailable or has been lost. 
The charter dataset also includes other unpublished documents with information on 
inheritance systems: 18 contracts of membership right purchase (vicinia) by outsiders, 
from a pdf file version of parchments, which are available online at http://www.tren- 
tinocultura.net/catalogo/cat_fondi_arch/pergamene/cat_pergamene_h.asp, and whose 
content has been coded; two letters from the local governor to the Prince of Trento, 
dated 1583 and 1584, concerning the reformation of inheritance system in Val di 
Fiemme, AST, lat. sect., C.12, f. 69 and 72. 
 
CADASTRAL REGISTERS 
 
1780 Cadastral Register, unpublished. Data have been collected only for a subset  
of the villages. More precisely, the data refer to 32 geographical units, which corre- 
spond to 37 villages in our dataset. In terms of population, they comprise about 7.9 
percent of the regional population (1810 census). The geographical units are Bleggio, 
Bollentina, Caldes, Carciato, Castello, Castelnuovo, Cavizzana, Celledizzo, Cellentino, 
Cogolo, Comasine, Commezzadura, Croviana, Dimaro, Levico, Magras, Malé, Menas, 
Mezzana, Monclassico, Montes, Ortisé, Ossana, Peio, Pellizzano, Predazzo, Presson, 
Rabbi, Samoclevo, Termenago, Terzolas, and Vermiglio. Data were collected by Goio 
(1978) for the village of Levico, by Varesco (1981) for the village of Predazzo, and 
directly from the manuscript volumes of the Catasti Teresiani, which can be found    
in the APTN (Archivio Provinciale di Trento). Specifically, they were taken from the 
“estratti tabellari” of the Catasti (2/1, 13/1-4, 34/1-2, 89/2, 90/1, 91/1, 92/1, 93/1, 94/1, 
95/1, 96/1, 97/1, 98/1, 99/1, 100/1, 101/1, 102/2, 103/1, 105/1, and 162/1). Most likely, 
this sample over-represents some areas (e.g., Val di Sole). For each village, we have 
the total surface of common land, the total surface of private land, and the surface 
breakdown by land use and quality; moreover, we have the data about land income (i.e., 
rent subject to taxation). When not available, land rents were estimated by attributing 
the rents for land of similar type and quality that could be found inside and outside   
the village. In these villages, 58.5 percent of the surface was common property, which 
represented 24.5 percent of the total in terms of rent. 
1897 Cadastral Register, published. Land registers data as reported in Consiglio 
provinciale d’agricoltura pel Tirolo (1903–1904). The 1897 register comes from a new 
land survey carried out in the mid-nineteenth century with different criteria from those 
guiding the 1780 Theresian Cadastral Registers (Catasti Teresiani) and with the addi- 
tion of maps (Mappe Napoleoniche). The 1897 land register included 378 geographical 
units; however, 12 units have been excluded because they were fully outside the present- 
day region. The remaining 366 villages had a total area of 6,251.43 km2, which is 0.6 
percent larger than the current area of the province of Trento. The dataset divides the 
surface into different uses, such as plow land, meadow, fruit garden, vineyard, grazing 
land, alp, forest, lake and pond, wasteland and houses, and total surface in hectares. 
Nonetheless, this source does not report rents or distinguishes between common and 
individual land. 
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POPULATION DATA 
 
1810 Census. It is reported in Andreatta and Pace (1981). The census divides Trentino 
into 365 geographical units with a total population of 226,253 inhabitants. 
1897 Census. It is reported in Consiglio provinciale d’agricoltura pel Tirolo (1903– 
1904). The 366 geographical units that were considered had a total population in 1897 
of 356,423 inhabitants. With respect to the 1810 census, the 1897 census included the 
village of Piazzo, which in 1810, was originally merged with another geographical unit. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
General References 
 
Aberle, David. “Matrilineal descent in cross-cultural comparison.” In Matrilineal 
kinship, edited by David M. Schneider and Kathleen Gough, 655–730. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1961. 
Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn. “On the Origins of Gender Roles: 
Women and the Plough.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 2 (2013): 
469–530. 
Alfani, Guido. “Le Partecipanze: il caso di Nonantola.” In La gestione delle risorse 
collettive nell’Italia settentrionale (secoli XII-XVIII), edited by Guido Alfani and 
Riccardo Rao, 48–62. Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011. 
Boserup, Ester. Woman’s Role in Economic Development. London: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd, 1970. 
Casari, Marco. “Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and 
Community Governance in the Italian Alps.” Journal of Economic History 67, 
no.1 (2007): 191–226. 
Casari, Marco, and Maurizio Lisciandra. “L’evoluzione della trasmissione ereditaria 
delle risorse collettive in Trentino tra i secoli XIII e XIX.” In La gestione delle 
risorse collettive nell’Italia settentrionale (secoli XII-XVIII), edited by Guido 
Alfani and Riccardo Rao, 17–31. Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011. 
———. “Gender Discrimination in Property Rights.” IZA Discussion Papers No. 7938, 
Bonn, Germany, 2014. 
———. “Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources.” IZA Discussion 
Papers No. 9061, Bonn, Germany, 2015. 
Cole, John W., and Eric R. Wolf. The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an 
Alpine Valley. New York: Academic Press, 1974. 
De Moor, Tine. “The Silent Revolution: A New Perspective on the Emergence of 
Commons, Guilds, and other Forms of Corporate Collective Action in Western 
Europe.” International Review of Social History 53, no. S16 (2008): 179–212. 
———. “Avoiding Tragedies: A Flemish Common and its Commoners under the 
Pressure of Social and Economic Change during the Eighteenth Century.” 
Economic History Review 62, no. 1 (2009): 1–22. 
Divale, William T. “Migration, External Warfare and Matrilocal Residence.” Behavior 
Science Research 9, no. 2 (1974): 75–133. 
 Casari and Lisciandra 
 
 
Ember, Melvin, and Carol R. Ember. “The Conditions Favoring Matrilocal Versus 
Patrilocal Residence.” American Anthropologist 73, no. 3 (1971): 571–94. 
Flinn, Mark V. “Uterine vs. Agnatic Kinship Variability and Associated Cross-Cousin 
Marriage Preferences: An Evolutionary Biological Analysis.” In Natural Selection 
and Social Behavior, edited by Richard D. Alexander and Donald W. Tinkle, 
439–75. New York: Chiron Press, 1981. 
Gaulin, Steven J.C., and Alice Schlegel. “Paternity Confidence and Paternal Investment: 
A Cross-Cultural Test of a Sociobiological Hypothesis.” Ethology and Sociobiology 
1, no. 4 (1980): 301–9. 
Gray, Patrick J. “Ethnographic Atlas Codebook.” World Cultures 10, no. 1 (1998): 
86–136. 
Hardin, Garrett. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science (AAAS) 162, no. 3859 
(1968): 1243–48. 
Hartung, John. “Matrilineal Inheritance: New Theory and Analysis.” Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 8, no. 4 (1985): 661–88. 
Holden, Clare J., and Ruth Mace. “Spread of Cattle Led to the Loss of Matrilineal 
Descent in Africa: A Coevolutionary Analysis.” Proceedings of the Royal Society 
of London B 270, no. 1532 (2003): 2425–33. 
Inama, Vigilio. Fondo e la sua storia. Rovereto, TN: Mercurio, 1931. 
Jones, Doug. “The Matrilocal Tribe.” Human Nature 22, no. 1–2 (2011): 177–200. 
Keesing, Roger M. Kin Groups and Social Structure. New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1975. 
Mace, Ruth, and Clare J. Holden. “A Phylogenetic Approach to Cultural Evolution.” 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 20, no. 3 (2005): 116–21. 
Murdock, George P. “Ethnographic Atlas: A Summary.” Ethnology 6, no. 2 (1967): 
109–236. 
Murdock, George P., and Douglas R. White. “Standard Cross-Cultural Sample.” 
Ethnology 8, no. 4 (1969): 329–69. 
Neeson, Jeanette M. Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in 
England, 1700–1820. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Netting, Robert McC. Balancing on an Alp, Ecological Change and Continuity in a 
Swiss Mountain Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Rizzoli, Giulio. Il Trentino nella sua condizione politica dei secoli XVIII e XIX. Feltre, 
BL: Zanussi, 1903. 
Rösch, Paul. Südtiroler Erbhöfe: Menschen und Geschichten. Bolzano: Raetia, 1994. 
Tagliapietra, Claudio. “A Threshold Hypothesis of Institutional Change: Collective 
Action in the Italian Alps during the 13th-19th Centuries.” Ph.D. thesis. Mimeo. 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2013. 
White, Douglas R., Michael L. Burton, and Malcom M. Dow. “Sexual Division of 
Labor in African Agriculture: A Network Autocorrelation Analysis.” American 
Anthropologist 83, no. 4 (1981): 824–49. 
 
References to Data Sources 
 
Andreatta, Giampaolo, and Silvio Pace. Trentino, autonomia e autogoverno locale. 
Trento: Saturnia, 1981. 
Gender Discrimination in Property Rights  
 
 
Bellettini, Athos. La popolazione italiana: Un profilo storico. Torino: Einaudi, 1987. 
Casetti, Albino. Guida storico-archivistica del Trentino. Collana di monografie della 
società di Studi per la Venezia Tridentina, Trento, 1961. 
Chiocchetti, Bernardino. “Ambiente sociale e movimento demografico a Moena nel 
XVIII secolo.” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, Department of Literature and 
Philosophy, 1982–83, 1983. 
Chiocchetti, Valentino, and Pio Chiusole. Romanità e Medioevo nella Vallagarina. 
Rovereto, TN: Manfrini Editori, 1965. 
Consiglio provinciale d’agricoltura pel Tirolo. “Tabelle sulle condizioni agricole 
forestali economiche.” In Bollettino del Consiglio provinciale d’agricoltura, fasc. 
4–12 del 1903 e fasc. 1–9 del 1904. Trento: Monauni, 1903. 
Debiasi, Laura. “Contributo allo studio della popolazione del Trentino nel XVII secolo.” 
In Studi e Ricerche Storiche sulla Regione Trentina, edited by C.E.S. Trentino. 
Padova: Stediv, 1953. 
Epiboli, Alfonso. “Ambiente sociale e movimento demografico a Borgo Valsugana nella 
seconda metà del Settecento.” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, Department of 
Literature and Philosophy, 1976–77, 1977. 
Fiebiger, Herbert. Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft Südtirols: eine Darstellung ihrer 
Situation und ihrer Probleme. Bergisch Gladbach: Heider, 1959. 
Fontana, Leone. Bibliografia degli statuti dell’Italia superiore. Torino: Bocca, 1907. 
Framba, Lidia. “Ambiente sociale e movimento demografico a Cogolo nel XVIII 
secolo.” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, Department of Literature and 
Philosophy, 1977–78, 1978. 
Franceschini, Italo. “Uomini e territorio a Pinè tra XV e XVIII secolo.” In Storia di 
Piné: Dalle origini alla seconda metà del XX secolo, edited by Marco Bettotti, 
223–334. Baselga di Piné, TN: Comune di Baselga, 2009. 
Giacomoni, Fabio. Carte di regola e statuti delle comunità rurali trentine. 3 vols. 
Milano: Edizioni Universitarie Jaca, 1991. 
Goio, Renata. “Ambiente economico-sociale e movimento demografico a Levico nella 
seconda metà del Settecento.” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, Department of 
Literature and Philosophy, 1977–78, 1978. 
Malanima, Paolo. L’economia Italiana - Dalla crescita medievale alla crescita 
contemporanea. Ed. Collana “Le vie della Civiltà.” Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002. 
Motta, Loredana. “Aspetti di storia economica e demografica di una valle del Trentino: la 
Valle del Fersina.” Laurea thesis, University of Bologna, Department of Literature 
and Philosophy, 1977–78, 1978. 
Nequirito, Mauro. Le carte di regola delle comunità trentine, Introduzione storica e 
repertorio bibliografico. Mantova: G. Arcari Editore, 1988. 
Pederiva, Luca. “Ambiente sociale e movimento demografico nella Parrocchia di Fassa 
nel XVIII secolo.” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, Department of Literature 
and Philosophy, 1984–85, 1985. 
Piva, Jole. “Ambiente economico-sociale e movimento demografico a Pergine nella 
seconda metà del settecento.” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, Department of 
Literature and Philosophy, 1980–81, 1981. 
Rizzoli, Giulio. Contributo alla storia del diritto statutario del Trentino. Feltre, BL: 
Zanussi, 1901. 
Sartori, Maria. “Ambiente economico-sociale e movimento demografico a Rovereto 
nel XVIII sec.: (1737–1786).” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, Department of 
Literature and Philosophy, 1978–79, 1979. 
 Casari and Lisciandra 
 
 
Sartori-Montecroce, Tullio. La comunità di Fiemme e il suo diritto statutario. Cavalese, 
TN: Magnifica comunità di Fiemme, 2002. 
Varesco, Giulio. “Ambiente economico-sociale e movimento demografico a Predazzo 
nella seconda metà del Settecento.” Laurea thesis, University of Padova, 
Department of Literature and Philosophy, 1980–81, 1981. 
Wopfner, Herrmann. Bergbauernbuch: von Arbeit und Leben des Tiroler Bergbauern in 
Vervangenheit und Gegenwart. Innsbruck: Wagner, 1954. 
 
Archives 
 
APTN (Archivio Provinciale di Trento). 
AST (Archivio di Stato di Trento - Trento Archive), lat. sect., C.12, f. 69 and 72. 
